Western theory of Communism

Communism and Political Culture Theory

Gabriel A. Almond

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Comparative PoUtics, Volume 15, Issue 2 (Jan., 1983), 127-138.

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Communism and Political Culture Theory

Gabriel A. Almond

A Test of Political Culture Theory

The success or failure of communist regimes in transforming the attitudes and behavior of populations may constitute a test of the explanatory power of po- litical culture theory.^ We may view communist regimes as ''natural experi- ments" in attitude change. Such regimes seek and usually succeed in estab- lishing organization and communication media monopolies, as well as pene- trative police and internal intelligence systems. Ideological conformity is re- warded; deviation is heavily penalized. Communities and neighborhoods come under the surveillance of party activists. Children of all ages are or- ganized in party -related formations, and school instruction places emphasis on appropriate ideological indoctrination. In addition to this powerful array of in- stitutional and communication controls, the communist movement has a clear-cut, explicit set of attitudes, beliefs, values, and feelings that it seeks to inculcate.

Political culture theory imputes some importance to political attitudes, be- liefs, values, and emotions in the explanation of political, structural, and be- havioral phenomena. national cohesion, patterns of political cleavage, modes of dealing with political conflict, the extent and the character of par- ticipation in politics, and compliance with authority. Political culture has never seriously been advanced as the unidirectional ''cause" of political structure and behavior, although political culture theorists have been repre- sented as taking such a position by some critics.^ The relaxed version of po- litical culture theory . the one presented by most of its advocates . is that the relation between political structure and culture is interactive, that one cannot explain cultural propensities without reference to historical experience and contemporary structural constraints and opportunities, and that, in turn, a prior set of attitudinal patterns will tend to persist in some form and degree and for a significant period of time, despite efforts to transform it. All these qualifications and claims are parts of political culture theory. The argument

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Comparative Politics January 1983

would be that however powerful the effort, however repressive the structure, however monopolistic and persuasive the media, however tempting the in- centive system, political culture would impose significant constraints on ef- fective behavioral and structural change because underlying attitudes would tend to persist to a significant degree and for a significant period of time. This is all that we need to demonstrate in order to make a place for political culture theory in the pantheon of the explanatory variables of politics.

The communist experience is particularly important as an approach to test- ing political culture theory because from one point of view it represents a gen- uine effort to "falsify" it. The attitudes that communist movements encounter in countries where they take power are viewed as false consciousness. whether they be nationalism, religious beliefs, liberal-pluralistic views, ethnic subcultural propensities, or attitudes toward economic interests. These at- titudes are viewed as the consequences of preexisting class structure and the underlying mode of production, as transmitted by associated agents of indoc- trination. Communist movements either eliminate or seek to undermine the legitimacy of these preexisting structures and processes and replace them with a quite new and thoroughly penetrative set. If they succeed in some reasonable length of time. let us say, a generation. in transforming attitudes in the de- sired direction, we might conclude that political culture theory has been fal- sified, that it is a weak variable at best.

Surely communist takeovers are the best historical experiments we have for these purposes. In addition, there are quite a few of them; they have occurred in different cultural-developmental settings; and most of them have been in operation for a generation. The principal problem with this approach to testing theory is that it leaves much to be desired as an experimental test. The ''laboratories" are not open to investigators; the data are spotty and in large part inferential. And finally the scale and the intensity of the efforts underta- ken to change attitudes have varied from one country to another. The experi- ences of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are quite different from those of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Yugoslavia.

One further intriguing point about this topic is that it represents a good il- lustration of a payoff for theory derived from area case studies. From this point of view the reader should not expect a contribution to the depth of knowledge about an area but an exploitation of findings in an effort to de- velop theory.

Political Culture Theory In Marxism and Leninism

This utilization of communist experience to test political culture theory fits congenially into the great themes of Marxist and Leninist ideology. The term

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has come into increasing usage in Soviet and East European social science. Stephen White notes that Lenin employed the term and that Brezhnev used it also.^ Georgi Shaknazarov, the president of the Soviet Political Science Asso- ciation, in an article published in Pravda on January 17, 1979, announcing the meeting of the International Political Science Association in Moscow, listed political culture as one of the three major subjects of political science. He de- fined political culture as ''the participation of diverse social opinions in poli- tics, the political culture of the people and political culture training, the regu- lation of social-political attitudes." He presented this topic as being at the same level of importance as the study of the state and the political system and the study of foreign policy and international relations.

Aside from such indications of terminological receptivity, the phenomena of political culture have been accorded an important place in communist the- ory, although the terms employed by Marx, Lenin, and contemporary com- munist scholars are ideology, consciousness, spontaneity, economism, and the like. In the works of Marx and Engels, political culture phenomena are important intervening variables; in Lenin's political culture. in particular, elite political culture. is the independent variable. Indeed, an elite possessed of a particular political culture in the sense of an indoctrinated communist party and an ''objective revolutionary situation" very broadly defined are the necessary and sufficient conditions of communist revolution. No one can read Lenin's organizational text. What Is to Be Done, without becoming aware of how much importance he attached to the proper indoctrination of the com- munist party, the unambiguous explication of beliefs, procedures, and appro- priate affective modalities.

For Marx, a changed political consciousness was a consequence of under- lying structural alterations. it developed gradually at first and changed its cognitive content and affective tone as the means of production and class characteristics and relations changed. Marx predicted that at certain points in the historical process, for example, at the point of extreme proletarian "im- miseration," the cultural transformation would be more rapid. Although the concepts of political socialization and elite political culture are present in Marxism, they are not weir developed. According to Marx, capitalist ideology gradually loses its force as its deviation from reality becomes increasingly plain. Men are rational actors; the leaders "catch on" first, the followers soon after. The transformation of political culture occurs in bursts and is congruent with major structural changes. ^the dictatorship of the proletariat, the intro- duction of socialism and of communism. The learning process may be slow, but it is sure.

Marxism is thus a structural theory. Marx would probably have sided with Brian Barry, Carole Pateman, and Ronald Rogowski about the priority of structure in the causal interaction with attitude, belief, and feeling. Changes in

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culture follow inevitably from changes in structure; cultural properties have a consequential relation to structure. Attitudinal variables explain lead and lag in the processes of historical change and hence may be viewed as intervening rather than independent variables.

It is clear from the Leninist strategy of elite and mass political socialization that Lenin understood the interactive character of structural-cultural relation- ships. He believed in the possibility of indoctrinating a revolutionary elite, in other words, transforming its political culture. But he did not believe that the revolutionary indoctrination of the masses was possible. Ordinary workers and peasants had to be manipulated into revolution by appealing to their im- mediate values and interests; that is, the revolutionary elite would have to adapt their revolutionary tactics to the cultures of the masses. Lenin expected that once a revolution had been attained these subcultural tendencies among the workers, peasants, ethnic, and religious groups would persist for some unknown length of time until the communist millennium, which would be brought about by fundamental structural changes.

In the Marxism-Leninism currently explicated in the theoretical and ''social science" literature of socialist countries, the full conceptual framework of political culture theory is employed. It is easy to see why the term has been adopted by socialist social scientists. Although the term subculture was not employed until recently, it has always been assumed that each class under capitalism has its own subculture, which, in turn, imposes a constraint on communist strategy and tactics. The peasantry under capitalism can be mobilized for land reform but not for socialism. Even under socialism, re- sidual peasant proprietary attitudes persist and impose limits on policy. The working class is inclined toward * 'bread and butter" economic goals, not so- cialist ones, and the persistence of such residual attitudes under socialism af- fects productivity and public policy. An incentive system inconsistent with the egalitarian values of communism must be continued to take account of these propensities. Professionals and technical specialists continue to be seduced by the values and special interests of their professions; these cultural propensities persist under sociahsm and explain the continuous struggles between the party and various specialists in the bureaucracy and the society.

Ethnicity as an ineradicable basis of subculture manifests itself, according to Marxist- Leninist doctrine, in secessionist and autonomist tendencies. Under capitalism, ethnicity can be mobilized in the form of liberation move- ments affiliated with or led by indoctrinated communists. Under socialism, ethnicity persists, justifying federal governmental arrangements. Ethnic sub- cultural identities as expressed in linguistic, literary, and cultural forms, as well as cuisine, costumes, festivals, and the like, are acknowledged as legiti- mate and reconcilable with socialist univeralism. Religious subcultures are viewed as basically reactionary formations fostering vestigial attitude pat-

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terns. Accommodations to religious communities under socialism, in contrast to ethnicity, are expedient and are entered into only on tactical political grounds.

The theme of political culture change is a powerful one in Leninist theory. Certain attitudinal changes are assumed to occur in the transition from feudal forms of the political economy to capitalist forms and from early capitalist forms to later ones. After a communist revolution takes place, certain attitude changes are supposed to accompany the shift from the period of the proletar- ian dictatorship to the period of socialism, and a set of related structural and cultural changes is assumed to be associated with the shift from socialism to communism.

Marxist-Leninist theory has well-articulated views on the agents and the processes of political socialization. All the agents of socialization treated in the Western socialization literature are to be found in the socialist literature. Family, church, school, work place, interest group, political party, the media of communication, local government, and government output and perfor- mance are all recognized as having some impact on political attitudes and culture. The principal distinction made in Leninist theory is between those agents of socialization that foster traditional patterns of political culture and those that foster rational and appropriate ones. Families, religious bodies, ethnic communities, professional groups, and face-to-face communication media outside the Communist party and related organizations tend to foster re- sidual cultural tendencies, whereas schools, the Communist party and related organizations, and the mass media of communication are the principal agents of appropriate political socialization.

Political Culture in Communist Reality

If we turn from ideological formulations to the political reality of Eastern Europe, the picture we get of political attitudes and values is a complex and varied one. We may perhaps distinguish three versions of political culture in communist countries: (1) the official or ideological political culture that is a mix of exhortation and imputation, (2) the operational political culture or what the regime is prepared to tolerate and believes it has succeeded in attaining, and (3) the real political culture based on evidence such as opinion surveys and other kinds of research or on inferences drawn from the media or official statements. The distinctions among these three versions of political culture need to be elaborated. All communist regimes have some version of the Leninist ideological culture, although in those countries that made their own revolutions (e.g., Yugoslavia, China, and Cuba), the political culture may deviate from the ideal model, from the Soviet version, and from the versions in

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those countries dominated by the Soviet Union. The operational political cul- ture consists of values, attitudes, and feelings that the regime is prepared to tolerate at least in the short run, given the universal shortfall from the ideological model in all communist countries. This operational model may encompass the extreme of Hungary, where Kadar's slogan of the 1960s, ''He who is not against us is with us," represents a substantial admission of defeat in efforts undertaken to produce positive culture transformation, to the situa- tion in the Soviet Union, where the operational expectations are a good deal more positive and are in part supported by reality.

The difference between what is sometimes called the operational political culture and the real political culture is defined in a sense by the battleground between the regimes' immediate campaigns and efforts to change attitudes, behavior, beliefs, and the affective tone of the population. From this point of view we can argue that Kadar's slogan is an acknowledgement that the Com- munist party of Hungary had failed to falsify political culture theory or that the ''Czech Spring" is dramatic evidence of a similar sort that a score of years of organizational and media monopoly, repression and terror, and powerful in- centives had failed to alter in any significant degree the civic propensities of the Czechoslovak population. Insofar as the operational political culture itself acknowledges the resistance it is encountering and in the degree that it has lowered its sights from some reasonable approximation of a Marxist-Leninist culture, we can argue that political culture theory survives unfalsified. If in addition evidence of a direct sort points to the fact that attitudes and beliefs among the population fall significantly short of this official operational political culture, then we have even stronger confirmation of the validity of political culture theory.

The ideological political culture in every communist country posits an ideal communist man who is both the builder of the new society and a product of its institutions and practices. The fullest elaboration of the qualities of this ideal communist man is to be found in the Progam of the Communist party of the Soviet Union adopted by the 22nd Congress in 1961, in a section entitled "The Moral Code of the Builder of Communism." Some version of this moral code (or something very similar in the values and qualities stressed) is to be found in a central place in the most important ideological formulations, training manuals, school books, and the like of all the communist countries. The qualities stressed include "dedication to the Communist cause; love for the socialist motherland and other socialist countries; conscientious labor for the good of society; a high consciousness of social duty; collectivism and comradely mutual assistance and respect; moral integrity in public and private life; intolerance of injustice, dishonesty or careerism; friendship and brother- hood with the other peoples of the USSR, and solidarity with the workers and peoples of other countries; and firm opposition to the enemies of communism, peace and freedom."^

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The evidence does not suggest that any of the communist regimes has suc- ceeded in inculcating these values among significant parts of the population. Even in the Soviet Union, where the regime has been in substantial control of the population for two full generations and where the revolution was led by an indigenous elite, the extent of success in remodeling man has been relatively modest. Samuel Huntington's claim that the Soviet Union is a dramatically successful case of planned political culture change would seem to be exagger- ated.^ This is not to argue that there have been no positive accomplishments in culture change. The Soviet regime has widespread legitimacy; its centralized, penetrating, and relatively unlimited institutions are accepted. A diffuse no- tion of socialism has widespread validity, and the acceptance of the obligation of sociopolitical activism in the sense of participating in campaigns has strong and widespread support. But these limited successes in the center of the com- munist world hardly extend into the countryside, into the blue-collar, rela- tively uneducated working class, or into the non-European parts of Russia. It can be argued that particularly in Asiatic Russia, where traditional-religious attitudes and ethnic nationalism display considerable staying power, Soviet indoctrinators have had to come to terms with stubborn traditionalism of vari- ous kinds. ^ Much of the legitimacy of the Soviet regime, one writer argues, results from the fact that the structure of the Soviet system is very much like the preexisting tsarist one in the sense of centralization, the extensive scope of government, and its arbitrariness. The acceptance of socialism as well as the obligation of sociopolitical activism is the success story of communist politi- cal socialization, but these attitudes tend to be concentrated in the European center and among the educated, professional, and white-collar strata of the population.^ Political activism in this context should not be confused with civic and political participation; instead, it takes the form of mobilized activity and voluntary public service. One writer has described Soviet participation in the following terms: 'The many political and administrative activities in which Soviet citizens participate take place within a dual framework of con- trol. The hierarchical structure of the Soviets, and of the Soviet political system in general, serves to coordinate the agenda and priorities of the participatory organs at any given moment, concentrating them on centrally determined goals, while the supervision of Communist party organs provides control of staffing, leadership selection, and auditing of the quality of activities."^

This contrast between the ideological and the operational political culture creates a certain tension among communist ideologists and students of public opinion and the media of communication. With the introduction of public opinion research in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1960s, the problem of opinion and attitude differences had to be confronted, for it pro- duced a polemic of modest proportions among monists" and pluralists." A. K. Uledov, a Soviet interpreter of public opinion who presents a monist point of view, argued that deviations in opinion from the ideological model

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reflect a lag between the old and the new, between progressive and backward forces. Proponents of a pluralist point of view, reflected in the writing of Grushin and to a much greater extent in the work of Polish, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav scholars, argue that under socialism, nonconforming opinion may contribute to social progress. Thus the pluralist attempt to legitimate op- positional and critical tendencies, thereby reducing the tensions between the ideological, the operational, and the real political culture, tends to reduce the ideological model to that of a credo by adopting an operative normative model more reconcilable with reality. This treatment of pluralism as legitimate, however, is distinctly a minor theme in the more conservative communist re- gimes, having surfaced primarily in such countries as Poland, Czechoslova- kia, and Yugoslavia.^

In testing political culture theory in communist countries it is useful to sort them into three categories: (1) the Soviet Union itself where the communist ''experiment" began and was carried through by an indigenous communist elite; (2) other countries such as Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam where the communist revolution was imported and carried out by indigenous elites; and (3) countries such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and East Germany where communist regimes were imposed from the outside. For our purposes in this paper we will examine briefly the experience of (1) the Soviet Union, (2) Yugoslavia and Cuba, and (3) Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. If political culture theory is to be falsified, we would expect to see major change in political culture in the desired direction in all three cat- egories and to a larger degree in the case of the Soviet Union because its rev- olution was indigenous and has been in operation more than sixty years; to a substantial degree in Yugoslavia and Cuba because their revolutions were made by indigenous elites; and to a lesser degree in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia because their communist regimes, which have been in exis- tence for only a single generation, were imposed on them from the outside and have been maintained by the threat or the actuality of Soviet military occupa- tion.

Political Culture in Yugoslavia and Cuba

In the case of Yugoslavia it may be inappropriate to speak of three versions of political culture. The Leninist ideological version is not seriously propagated. The operational version is a relatively loosely formulated set of norms and ex- pectations that on the basis of empirical evidence are not too far from the real- ity of opinion and attitude. These norms include an acceptance of ethnic iden- tity and of political autonomy of the various ethnic components, an accep- tance of private land ownership among the peasantry, and of religious free-

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dom. The two new elements in Yugoslav political culture are political ac- tivism and participation and enterprise self-management, which ideologically is supposed to represent the fulfillment of the ideal of participation and the es- sence of Yugoslav democratic socialism. Here one can distinguish a differ- ence between the official political culture and the real political culture. The official political culture sanctions ''classlessness" in participatory patterns; but much evidence that has been gathered from studies of political recruitment and opinion surveys demonstrates that political participation in the sense of officeholding and other forms of activism is biased toward the upper social and economic groupings in the population and is dominated by members of the League of Communists. Enterprise self-management appears to be effec- tive. It involves all levels of workers in matters having to do with wages, hours, conditions of labor, and similar trade union issues but not in production and other management decisions.^Â® Thus the political leadership of Yugosla- via has settled for a set of operational political cultural norms that accommo- date prerevolutionary ethnic, religious, and economic propensities and the so- cialization agencies that tend to perpetuate them. The novel elements of par- ticipation and decentralized socialism have been accepted in a limited way, particularly among the educated, advantaged, and politically mobilized strata of the population.

In contrast to Yugoslavia, another country that made its own revolution. Cuba. has been subjected to concentrated indoctrination designed to produce a new Cuban socialist man." This ideological political culture differs from the Leninist one in its lack of emphasis on the party" and its greater empha- sis on heroism, selflessness, personalismo, and the propaganda of the deed. It appears to draw on a Latin American revolutionary tradition as much as on specifically Leninist ideological norms. In two decades of Cuban commu- nism, these ideals have been propagated in connection with major campaigns of mobilization for purposes of defense, literacy, sugar cane harvesting, and revolutionary-military activities abroad. Such evidence as we have from re- ports and surveys of one kind or another suggests that these campaigns have had moderate success in creating regime legitimacy, the acceptance of the norm of activism in the implementation of goals, and the acceptance of so- cialism in the diffuse sense of that term. In recent years there is evidence of growing bureaucratization, less stress on Utopian ideals and mass mobiliza- tion, and more stress on efficiency and regimentation. A pattern similar to that in the Soviet Union, in which the Utopian culture of the socialist man takes on the proportions of an eschatology and the operational political culture stresses compliance with the regime's policies and programs, may emerge. Real popular values and attitudes may increasingly take the form of adaptions to constraints and incentives as well as according legitimacy to the new institu-

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Thus our three cases of indigenous communist revolutions. the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Cuba. fail to falsify political culture theory. The revolutionary aims of creating a "socialist man" have been practically given up in the Soviet Union and Cuba and were never seriously pursued in Yugo- slavia. The Soviet Union has settled for popular legitimacy, a general belief in socialism, and a willingness to participate in campaigns initiated by the re- gime. The Yugoslav political elite has tended to accommodate itself to pow- erful ethnic commitments, peasant proprietary values, and religious beliefs and has successfully inculcated a sense of legitimacy, an acceptance of de- centralized socialism, and an obligation to participate.

In the case of Cuba, a personalist version of Leninism seems to be giving way to a more bureaucratic, apathetic relationship between elite and mass, with positive culture changes taking such forms as regime legitimacy, a belief in ''socialism," and an acceptance in some sense of the obligation to take part in campaigns.

The changes that have taken place under these relatively favorable cir- cumstances are of a limited sort, not of sufficient magnitude and character to falsify political culture theory and accord validity to a structural one.

The CasÂ«s of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

The communist experiences in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia offer even stronger supports for political culture theory. Communist parties have been in control in all three countries for over thirty years, and Soviet troop de- ployments and the Brezhnev Doctrine impose constraints on their policies. Despite these penetrative pressures and external threats and constraints, pre- revolutionary nationalist, religious, economic, and political attitudes have persisted and have resulted in the renunciation of sanguine expectations of fundamental attitude change. Were the Soviet threat to be neutralized, there is little doubt that liberal regimes, even ones initiated by the communist parties (as was the case in Czechoslovakia in 1967-68), would be established. Com- munist efforts at resocialization might have been counterproductive in the sense of having created strong liberal propensities in countries such as Poland and Hungary where those orientations were relatively weak in the prerevolu- tionary era.

In Poland after thirty years of revolutionary experience, something like a legitimate pluralist regime emerged in 1981, which allowed the new Solidar- ity union, the Catholic church, and the army to engage in bargaining relations with the Communist party. As of this writing it is not clear which arrange- ments will survive the martial law regime. On the positive side, there is evi- dence of an acceptance of a diffuse egalitarian socialism among a large pro-

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portion of the Polish population. But the evidence is overwhelming that the Polish working class continues to be passionately Polish, Catholic, and ''bread and butter" oriented. ^^

In Hungary, peasant proprietary attitudes, reflected in surveys showing that private garden plots and household improvements are the preoccupations of most of the agricultural population, remain strong. Similarly, religious at- titudes remain strong even among young people. Hungarian nationalism shows no signs of abating. One writer described the legitimacy of the com- munist regime in Hungary in the following terms: "The current standoff in Hungary between elites and potential publics is tenuous, but it appears as if everyone fears the hazards of questioning the situation too closely. "^^ Al- though most Hungarians accept an egalitarian socialism, there is little accep- tance of Marxism-Leninism among the population. In Hungary, the reaction to ideological indoctrination takes the form of a thoroughgoing depoliticiza- tion.^^

Of all the communist cases, that of Czechoslovakia presents the strongest support for political culture theory. As one writer observed of the period after 1948, ''Neither the new economic base nor the new institutional structures succeeded in changing the political cultures of Czechs and Slovaks in the di- rection which the holders of institutional power desired. If anything, the op- posite happened. The old values and beliefs were reinforced. ... If a Czech 'new man' had been created by 1968, he was, ironically, one more firmly de- voted to social democratic and libertarian values than the Czech of 1946. In the interactions between structures and cultures it would appear that the domi- nant Czech political culture came much closer to changing Czechoslovak Communism than Czechoslovak Communism came to procuring acceptance of its official political culture. "^^

What the scholarship of comparative communism has been telling us is that political cultures are not easily transformed. A sophisticated political move- ment ready to manipulate, penetrate, organize, indoctrinate, and coerce and given an opportunity to do so for a generation or longer ends up as much or more transformed than transforming. But we have to be clear about what kind of a case we are making for political culture theory. We are not arguing at all that political structure, historical experience, and deliberate efforts to change attitudes have no effect on political culture. Such an argument would be man- ifest foolishness. Major scholarly efforts such as those of Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith and Herbert Hyman demonstrate the powerful and homogenizing effects of education, the introduction of the mass media, and factory employment in very different cultural contexts.^Â® There is a major lit- erature of experimental studies on some of the conditions and possibilities of attitude change. What all this seems to demonstrate is that man is a complex animal who is tractable in some respects and intractable in others. Both the

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successes and the failures of our communist cases suggest that there is a pat- tern to this tractability-intractability behavior, that liberty once experienced is not quickly forgotten, and that equity and equality of some kind resonate in the human spirit.

NOTES

1 . This is a position argued by a number of British specialists on communist countries. See Ar- chie Brown and Jack Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977); also, Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (Lon- don: Macmillan, 1979). We have benefited greatly from these studies and conclusions.

2. See inter al. Brian M. Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (London: Col- lier-Mac mi llan, 1970), pp. 48ff.; Carole Pateman, "The Civic Culture: A Philosophical Critique" in Almond and Verba (eds.). The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1980); and Ronald Rogowski, A Rational Theory of Legitimacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

3. Archie Brown and Jack Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), p. 58. See also White's book-length treatment of this sub- ject, op. cit.

4. Stephen White in Archie Brown and Jack Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist Countries (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), pp. 35-36.

5. See Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, op. cit., pp. 114ff.

6. Ibid., p. 95; See also Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1974), pp. 322ff.

7. Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, op. cit. , chaps. 3 and 4. For a detailed analysis of participation in the Soviet Union, see Theodore H. Friedgut, Political Participation in the USSR (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), chap. 1 and pp. 307ff.

8. Ibid., p. 49. The Soviet regime has succeeded in inculcating a sense of "participatory-sub- ject competence" particularly among the educated strata of the society. See G. A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), and citations and discussions in Friedgut, op. cit., pp. 319ff.

9. Walter D. Connor and Zvi Gitelman, Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems (New York: Praeger, 1977), chap. 1.

10. David Dyker in Brown and Gray, op. cit., chap. 3; Jan Triska and Paul M. Cocks (eds.). Political Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 158ff.

1 1 . See Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969); Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), chap. 12; Francis Lambert, "Cuba: Communist State in Personal Dictatorship" in Brown and Gray, op. cit., chap. 8.

12. See Connor and Gitelman, op. cit. , chap. 2 and pp. 184ff; Brown and Gray, op. cit. , chap. 4; Triska and Cocks, op. cit., chap. 5.

13. Zvi Gitelman in Connor and Gitelman, op. cit., p. 161.

14. See also Brown and Gray, op. cit., chap. 5; and Triska and Cocks.

15. Archie Brown and Gordon Wightman, "Czechoslovakia: Revival and Retreat," in Brown and Gray, op. cit., p. 189; see also Connor and Gitelman, op. cit., p. 178.

16. Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Develop- ing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); and Herbert Hyman, The Eduring Ejects of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

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